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P
ragmatism, as a philosophy, is distinctly American in 
nature. Originally proposed as a means for truth evalua­
tion by Peirce in the 1870's, it was formally introduced 
by James as a standard philosophy at the turn of the 
century. Its focus on evaluative knowledge and disregard for 
metaphysical "Truths" set it at odds with the Continental philos­
ophy that preceded it in the nineteenth century.1 Dewey, who 
sought to restructure philosophy along the pragmatic lines that 
J ames had laid out, furthered the cenb:al concepts of Pragmatism 
in the decades following James. In recent years, pragmatism has 
again come to the forefront of philosophy, mainly through the 
work of Davidson in the philosophy of language, Kuhn in the 
philosophy of science, and Rorty in a more wide-ranging, social 
perspective (Rorty, 1989, 9-10). 
While taking a somewhat more drastic, and some may 
claim expansionist, view of Pragmatism, Rorty, while working 
towards synthesis with Davidson and Kulm, does follow along 
its main ideas. Rorty uses language as a stepping-stone to 
invesligate reality, and as a result, to liberate academia from the 
notion of a structured teality and a tepresentational view of 
"Truth." Rathet, his conception of language is, by no means, that 
of the philosophers who supported the linguistic turn in philoso­
phy that was witnessed in the twentieth century. However, his 
philosophy seems to present a return to the Kantian metaphysics 
of the nineteenth century, a move decidedly against any Prag­
matic notion. For Rorty, language is not the key to reality, but 
simply a tool to describe our perceptions of reality. This claim, 
though, leads to radical extrapolalion on the nature of reality, 
again, towards Kant. 
To return to the foundations of Pragmatism, James con­
sidered the main focus of his philosophy to be the delineation 
between "Truth" and "truth." "Truth" was, according to James, a 
somewhat antiquated notion. "Truth," as an entity, involved 
those things that a majority of persons agreed to as the way 
reality was. "truths," the noncapitalized variety, were those 
summations that involved our everyday life. He contended, 
however, that "Truth happens to an idea" (77). For James, the 
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truth of anything does not exist solely in the world; truth, in 
either form, is not an existent. Rather, truths are those facts that 
are verified as working in the world. Those facts that could not 
be verified or validated would be false. liThe true," James points 
out, "is only the expedient in our way of thinking" (86). As Rorty 
summarized, for James, truth = justifiability. What could be 
justified in nature, or through experience, was what was true, not 
in the scope of an ultimate reality, but true for the experience. 
(Rorty, 1991,127). 
Dewey took the idea of truth and ultimate reality further. 
He rejected the notion of ultimate reality as something on which 
philosophy had any intrinsic grasp. It was agreed that any notion 
of an ultimate reality would involve deliberation on a Kantian 
noumenal realm, one that could not be empirically verifiable. 
Thus, for Dewey, ultimate reality would, in essence, be a nonen­
tity, something that could be neither proven nor disproven. In 
logical terms, it was an empty statement. Philosophy had to shift 
its focus from this noumenal realm to the verifiable world, to 
what could be proven as true relative to the situation in which it 
was present (Dewey, 1957, 23-7). Also, Dewey felt that philoso­
phy had to exonerate itself from the ideas of "progress" and 
"ideals." Making reference to the trend in intellectual thought 
. following the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species, Dewey 
points to the shift from a notion of progress in evolution to the 
concept of continual change in lifeforms. Operating under the 
idea of Darwinian evolution, philosophy had to cease perpetuat­
ing the myth that an end goal was what it intended. Rather, 
philosophy was a changing form, one that worked in a grouping 
based on time, tradition, and culture (Dewey, 1998, 42). 
This is a key idea that Kuhn would later bring to the fore 
in the philosophy of science. Kuhn, while studying the history of 
scientific advancements, realized that dominant scientific theo­
ries did not show a progression. Rather, the history was indica­
tive of a series of revolutions in which one grouping of ideas 
replaced another in an attempt to explain or better describe 
reality and the world. These revolutions took place due to the 
natural tendency for science to expound on its theories, thus 
eventually leading to problems that could not be solved in rela­
tion to the dominant theory of the time. A new theory or way of 
thinking had to be brought forth, one that would attempt to 
rectify the problems that the prior way of thinking left unsolved. 
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Later, Kuhn and Rorty would call these outdated ways of think­
ing, replaced through revolution, paradigms (Kuhn, chs. 4-8). 
However, in a method removed from trends in philoso­
phy in the latter half of the twentieth century, neither James nor 
Dewey brings the philosophical weight of Pragmatism to bear 
directly on language. The dominant feature of traditional philos­
ophy following the Pragmatists was what is traditionally called 
the linguistic turn. During this period of philosophic thought, 
ontological methodology centered on language. It was felt that 
language held the answer to questions of ontology, epistemol­
ogy, and ultimately, existence and reality. This trend later 
branched off into conceptual analysis. With conceptual analysis, 
one felt content to ponder questions, and the language games in 
which tllese questions were presented, to determine the truth 
(Devitt and Sterelny, 280-7). This is the complete antithesis of 
Pragmatism; verifiability, in conceptual analysiS, had been rele­
gated to the mind and quasi-metaphysics, not to experience. 
James and Dewey cannot be blamed for arriving too early to 
critique tllese notions, for it would appear that both of them 
would have largely disagreed with the majority of the concepts 
present in the linguistic turn, and particularly those found in the 
works of the conceptual analysts. 
In particular, the Pragmatists would take issue with cog­
nitive verification as the only means towards truth. For the 
adherents of Pragmatism, it is crucial to have experiential verifi­
cation for "truths," not simply proof through idea problem­
solving that the conceptual analysts espoused. Thus, Rorty, 
writing after tlle linguistic turn, realized that any notions of 
reality and truth that he wished to posit would have to take into 
account language in some way. However, as a contemporary 
Pragmatist, it is not a stretch to assume that he would hold a 
deflationary view of language, one that, like the Pragmatists 
before him, places more of an emphasis on experience than 
metaphysics. 
Rorty does just that by appealing to Davidson as one of 
the main contributors to his theory of reality and language. 
Davidson has a somewhat deflationary view of language and its 
relation to the reality of language speakers. He posits the 
"passing theory" as a means to interpret the noises and gestures 
that each person makes. Davidson explodes the idea that lan­
guage has an intrinsic semantic quality to it. Instead, in accor­
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dance with his passing theory, an individual draws the meaning 
f sentences and words from experience and from verbal and 
~onverbal context clues. Communication between individuals is 
too prone to misinterpretation and error ,to be se~antically holi~­
tic. Rather, communication follows one s expenences and one s 
notions about these experiences and the relation they have to the 
world around them (Rorty, 1989, 11-16). 
Rorty recognizes the importance of Davidson's passing 
theory and the implications that it holds for philosophy. Without 
a truly semantic quality, language is stripped of its metaphysical 
ability of reality solving. Rorty, in the same vein as Dewey, 
rejects any idea of an ultimate reality. The world around us has 
no intrinsic nature or essencei it is an existent that the human 
perceives along side itself. 
This raises an interesting point in relation to language. 
Rorty claims that the work of Davidson is much like that of a 
"field linguist" interacting with a foreign, non-English speaking 
tribe. Here is where we see the passing theory in action: to 
discern what the natives are discussing, one must deal with 
experiential knowledge and causation. Reference is squeezed out 
of the language equation. As Rorty contends, " ...Davidson is 
suggesting we maximize coherence and truth first, and then let 
reference fall out as it mayl! (1991,134). 
RortyI alongside Davidson, has done away with any lin­
guistic theory of reference, and in essence, the philosophy of 
language. By letting reference "fall out as it may/, it would 
appear that language has become an almost relativistic form of 
communication. Reference has taken a strict Pragmatic bent; a 
thing's reference is determined by the expediency in understand­
ing that individuals gain by the reference-grounding that they 
create. Without a definite theory of reference fixing, language 
becomes an amorphous entity lacking any central standard 
against which it can be measured. This would appear to be a 
controversial concept. . 
DavidsonIs rejection of semantics, when combined with 
~orty's ideas of reality, lends itself to some interesting perspec­
tives on the nature of reality. As illustrated above in the discus­
sion of the.linguistic tum, many twentieth-century philosophers 
felt, an~ still contend, that language is a jigsaw puzzle, the final 
?"oal bemg ~e ability. to decipher ultimate reality. Rorty, borrow­
mg from WlttgenstemI sees language not as pieces to a jigsaw 
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puzzle, but as a tool for the description of reality (1989, 12-13). 
However, he takes a realist stance in relation to the world around 
him. Reality holds no mysteries for us, no clues to lead us to an 
ultimate goaL For there is no ultimate goal; much like Dewey's 
reflections on philosophy and Darwinian theory, Rorty sees lan­
guage as moving and evolving, but not towards any prescribed 
juncture with an overarching Truth: 
Truth cannot be out there - cannot exist independent of 
the human mind - because sentences cannot so exist, or 
be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of 
the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can 
be true or false. The world on its own - unaided by the 
describing activities of human beings - cannot. (5) 
The world, as an entity, exists outside the framework of the 
human. The individual is present in the world, exists in it as 
well, but is not secretly in touch with it Language, as Davidson 
has illustrated, is not a medium between the individual and 
reality. The gap between the individual and the world is not 
surmountable by language - or in another case, the concep t 
"mind" -and should not be viewed as a way to reach any 
conclusions about reality and the world (10). 
What use, then, does language - as a tool - fulfill? Lan­
guage describes tlle reality that an individual finds herself in. 
However, tlle world does not select certain words to serve as a 
means to describe itself. Language is a human creation. Thus, 
language is devoid of any knowledge of the world. And without 
an intrinsic nature, the world does not change, especially in 
regard to human values. "What does change, as history has 
shown, is language, as well as the ideas that language forms. As 
Rorty points out, " ... human beings make truths by making lan­
guage in which to phrase sentences" (9). 
Rorty presents us with an interesting dilemma: if the 
human is separated from the world, the world holds no final 
goal, and language serves as a descriptive agent for the world 
and provides the human with "trUtllS," how do we explain the 
supposed progression of human history towards the eventual 
complete description/ understanding of the world in which it 
exists? Rorty claims that fuis is not progress, but a process, one 
that continues unabated throughout human history. Societies, 
intellectuals, and individuals have always sought to understand 
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the world and reality around them. These have all operated in the 
groupings that Dewey commented on at the turn of the century 
and which Kuhn elucidated for the sciences, calling them 
paradigms. None of these have any access to the real nature of 
reality, but they are attempts none the less. 
Rorty's conception of history is that of changing vocabu­
laries. A dominant vocabulary is in place as a means to describe 
reality. This reality is not "Truth," for it is still not the medium 
for inter-human reality communion. However, it is the "truth" 
for those operating in the present paradigm; it is true for the 
knowledge that they have present before them. This is by no 
means static, though. As new vocabularies arise - for instance, 
with new scientific findings or the advent of new scientific 
theories - the new vocabulary gradually infringes on the former 
one. There is a time of muddled definitions as the two vocabular­
ies contest with each other, until gradually the new vocabulary 
reaches general acceptance, thus replacing the old vocabulary: 
(The method) .. .is to redescribe lots and lots of things in 
new ways, until you have created a pattern of linguistic 
behavior which will tempt the rising generation to 
adopt it, thereby causing them to look for apparent new 
forms of nonlinguistic behavior. (Rorty, 1989,9) 
These paradigm shifts, as termed by Kuhn, are a constant process 
of redescription of reality. Each new paradigm seeks a more 
efficient way to describe the world around it, one that attempts to 
solve the problems and inefficiencies of the previous paradigm 
(Kuhn, ch. 13). The shifting paradigms, though, get no closer to 
any overarching "Truth." Rather, each paradigm operates within 
the conceptions of language and knowledge that it has present 
before it. No paradigm is truer than any other - each has its own 
truth-value inside itself, not across paradigmatic lines (Rorty, 
1989,6-7). 
Rorty, following along traditional Pragmatic lines, delin­
eates between "Truth" and "truth." Truth, in both forms, are 
human creations, they do not exist freely in the world. Neither 
do they have any sort of form in the world; they exist purely as 
human creations and only as human creations. Thus, one can 
discard "Truth" - or metaphysical constants - because they draw 
conclusions from nature that are not there. To have "Truths," 
reality must have an intrinsic essence to it, an essence rejected by 
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Rorty. One is thus left with "truths" relative to the paradigm in 
which they find themselves living. These truths are the Prag­
matic, verifiable truths that we see in relation to our experience. 
And yet Rorty widens the scope of these truths: one sees 
in relation to her experience these truths are direct descriptions of 
the reality around the individual. They are not "Truths" for two 
reasons: first,there is no way for the individual to gain an 
ultimate grasp on reality, and second, without being able to grasp 
fully the nature of reality, they are simply operative in the 
paradigm in which they are present. They are bound to change, 
evolving in a constant state of change and upheaval (Rorty, 1989, 
9; 1991, 127). 
It is important here to note that although Rorty discusses 
paradigm shifts along the same lines as Kuhn, he does not 
subscribe to his notion of incommensurability, particularly in 
regard to the sciences. Kuhn contended that, in the time between 
paradigms, which he referred to as crisis, it was possible for two 
scientists to view the same experiment with the same results and 
IIsee" two different things. Each would be operating in his or her 
own paradigm, thus claiming that experimental results led to 
different, and sometimes conh'ary conclusions. For each scien­
tist, each result would symbolize a different element; words, 
language itself, would thus be intrinsically and semantically 
different based on the experiences of each scientist. Corrununi­
cation between the two paradigms would be impossible because 
the same words, the same results, were indicative of differing 
worldviews. This was the barrier of incommensurability (Kuhn, 
146-51). 
Rorty points out that incommensurability does not equate 
to unleamability, which thus leads to discussability. While the 
Aristotelian concept of the universe calU10t be directly translated 
into the Galilean, an adherent of one could be made to learn the 
other and to take it as a possible description of the working of the 
world. Here, Rorty takes something of a departure from the 
Pragmatism of James. James argued that one could claim that 
past theoretical concepts (Ptolemaic astronomy, Euclidean space, 
etc.) were "absolutely false," New developments have shown 
that these thinkers could have gone beyond the limits that they 
thought existed. Present thinkers have proven that new perspec~ 
tives on the world operate contrary to the past ones; for James 
this proves them false (86). Rorty views these inter-paradigm 
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valuations as invalid. "Ethnocentrism" - the idea that our con­
cept of true was created in our paradigm and cannot be applied 
to past paradigms - keeps the individual from being able to claim 
that one paradigm had a superior description of reality. Rorty 
would again claim that no concept of reality could ever be 
superior to another; all are hopelessly separated from the world 
and are not capable of bridging the human/world gap (1991, 
46-51). 
Whether consciously or unconsciously, Rorty raises an 
interesting, and even controversial, notion. We can start with a 
solidly Pragmatic idea - the world does not make facts true. Each 
description operates as a means to bridge the gap between the 
world and the human. However, this presents us with another 
surprising problem, one that might not typically be considered in 
the era of contemporary philosophy. The unbridgeable gap that 
Rorty claims exists between the human and the world is a similar 
one to that described by Kant, which he termed the division 
between the phenomenal (physical) realm and the noumenal 
(metaphysical) realm. The noumenal world was beyond our 
perceptions; it existed on the other side of the "wall of knowl­
edge." The noumenal realm could only be described through our 
rationalistic thoughts concerning it. The noumenal realm con­
tained notions that humans assumed a priori and then imposed 
on their reality to construct it from a blur.2 While not necessarily 
as strong a claim when placed alongside the realism of Rorty, 
Kant does recognize the significance of the metaphysical split in 
our reality. 
Rorty discusses the same division. Yet he does not posit a 
means to describe his noumenal world. Instead, he claims that 
we are forever separated from it and it is impossible for us to ever 
actually fully conceptualize and understand it. His phenomenal 
realm is created completely from human deSign; it is the concept 
of the universe, or paradigm, in which we, as individuals, work. 
The noumenal realm is the actual world, the world into which we 
have no insight. To use an almost Existential term, it would 
appear that the individual is alienated from the true nature of 
reality. 
This does not appear to be of concern to Rorty. In his 
thinking, we should abandon any conception of a connection 
with the world. Humans have for centuries lived this way, shel­
tered in the worldview of their respective paradigms. Society has 
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still functioned; humans have still found a sense of individual 
purpose or IImeaning" in their actions in the midst of this discon­
nectedness from the world. This conceptualization of reality 
brings the nature of science into question, however. If we can 
never bridge the gap between the human and the world, what 
good is continued scientific inquiry, especially if its main focus is 
the eventual description of the world around us? 
Rorty doesn't completely say. To him, scientific 
/I advancement" is part of a great"cultural conversation" that he 
sees as the development of human intellectual history. Rather 
than focus on the metaphysical, we should focus instead on the 
development of human culture and the societal implications that 
this portends. This is not a new concept; Dewey pushed for the 
same shift in focus in his Reconstruction in Philosophy. As stated 
previously, he thought philosophy futile if its only endeavor was 
to sit and discuss things, such as ultimate reality, that could never 
be fully quantified to begin with. This left philosophy in the 
peculiar position of leaving the general populace assuming that 
they had the key to the universe, when they had but a theoretical 
concept of little true cash value (Dewey, 1957, 23-5). 
Dewey does not appear to go as far as Rorty does, though. 
While he rejected the notion of ultimate reality, he never felt that 
humans were separated from the exact content of the world 
atound them. It is safe to assume that neither James nor Dewey, 
nor any of the other tum of the century Pragmatists would 
espouse the concepts that Rorty presents to us at the end of the 
same century. Rorty himself admits that what he calls 
"pragmatism" is more along the lines of "left-wing Kuhnianism" 
(1991, 38). This radical conception of reality, and the human 
separation from it, seems to bring the scope of philosophy back to 
the high-minded German metaphysicians, like Kant, with whom 
the Pragmatists sought to do away. Rorty has deflated the lin­
guistic turn in philosophy, while at the same time expanding the 
focus and range of Pragmatism from its pure form, i.e. of James 
and Dewey. Rorty, it would appear, seems content to expand on 
his foundation and rightly deserves the term neo-Pragmatist 
until a possible, more applicable one can be found. 
Western Maryland College 
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NOTES 

I See "Pragmatism" in Audi. 

2 Ibid. "Kant." 
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